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Why	  the	  hardest	  logic	  puzzle	  ever	  cannot	  be	  solved	  in	  less	  than	  three	  questions1	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Rabern	   and	   Rabern	   (2008)	   and	   Uzquiano	   (2010)	   have	   each	   presented	   increasingly	  
harder	  versions	  of	  ‘the	  hardest	  logic	  puzzle	  ever’	  (Boolos	  1996),	  and	  each	  has	  provided	  
a	  two-­‐question	  solution	  to	  his	  predecessor’s	  puzzle.	  But	  Uzquiano’s	  puzzle	  is	  different	  
from	   the	   original	   and	   different	   from	  Rabern	   and	   Rabern’s	   in	   at	   least	   one	   important	  
respect:	   it	   cannot	   be	   solved	   in	   less	   than	   three	   questions.	   In	   this	   paper	   we	   solve	  
Uzquiano’s	  puzzle	  in	  three	  questions	  and	  show	  why	  there	  is	  no	  solution	  in	  two.	  Finally,	  
to	  cement	  a	  tradition,	  we	  introduce	  a	  puzzle	  of	  our	  own.	  	  
***	  
	  
Recall	  Uzquiano’s	  puzzle	  and	  his	  guidelines	  for	  solving	  it.	  
Three	   gods,	   A,	   B,	   and	   C	   are	   called	   in	   some	   order,	   True,	   False,	   and	  
Random.	   True	   always	   speaks	   truly,	   False	   always	   speaks	   falsely,	   but	  
whether	  Random	  speaks	  truly	  or	  falsely	  or	  whether	  Random	  speaks	  at	  all	  
is	  a	  completely	  random	  matter.	  Your	  task	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  identities	  of	  
A,	  B,	  and	  C	  by	  asking	  three	  yes-­‐no	  questions;	  each	  question	  must	  be	  put	  
to	  exactly	  one	  god.	  The	  gods	  understand	  English,	  but	  will	  answer	  in	  their	  
own	   language,	   in	  which	  the	  words	   for	   ‘yes’	  and	   ‘no’	  are	   ‘da’	  and	   ‘ja’,	   in	  
some	  order.	  You	  don’t	  know	  which	  word	  means	  which.	  (Uzquiano	  2010:	  
44)	  
The	  guidelines:	  
1. It	  could	  be	  that	  some	  god	  gets	  asked	  more	  than	  one	  question.	  
2. What	   the	   second	  question	   is,	   and	   to	  which	  god	   it	   is	  put,	  may	  depend	  on	   the	  
answer	  to	  the	  first	  question.	  
3. Whether	  Random	  answers	  ‘da’	  or	  ‘ja’	  or	  whether	  Random	  answers	  at	  all	  should	  
be	  thought	  of	  as	  depending	  on	  the	  toss	  of	  a	  fair	  three-­‐sided	  dice	  hidden	  in	  his	  
brain:	   if	   the	   dice	   comes	   down	   1,	   he	   doesn’t	   answer	   at	   all;	   if	   the	   dice	   comes	  
down	  2,	  he	  answers	  ‘da’;	  if	  3,	  ‘ja’.	  
What	  distinguishes	  these	  puzzles	  from	  each	  other	  are	  three	  different	  specifications	  for	  
Random’s	   behavior.	   Boolos	   (1996)	   allows	   for	   Random	   to	   speak	   truly	   or	   lie,	   albeit	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randomly,	  whereas	  Rabern	  and	  Rabern	  (2008)	  stipulate	  that	  Random	  answers	  ‘da’	  and	  
‘ja’	   randomly.	   	   Both	   Uzquiano’s	   solution	   strategy	   as	   well	   as	   Rabern	   and	   Rabern’s	  
exploit	   a	   common	   trait	   in	   the	   first	   two	   puzzles,	   which	   is	   that	   there	   are	   yes/no	  
questions	  that	  True	  cannot	  answer	  and	  yes/no	  questions	  that	  False	  cannot	  answer,	  but	  
no	  question	  that	  Random	  will	  fail	  to	  answer.	  Uzquiano	  (2010)	  eliminates	  this	  particular	  
asymmetry	  from	  his	  version	  of	  the	  puzzle	  by	  granting	  Random	  the	  option	  of	  remaining	  
silent.	  This	  modification,	  need	   it	  be	  said,	   is	  what	  makes	  Uzquiano’s	   the	  hardest	   logic	  
puzzle	  ever.	  	  
There	  are	  three	  parts	  to	  our	  solution	  to	  Uzquiano’s	  puzzle.	  First,	  we	  assume	  that	  A,	  B,	  
and	  C	  agree	  to	  answer	  our	  questions	  in	  English,	  and	  we	  show	  how	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzle	  
in	  three	  questions.	  Next,	  we	  show	  how	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzle	  without	  this	  assumption.	  It	  
turns	  out	  that	  most	  scenarios	  covered	  by	  our	  solution	  resolve	  the	  identities	  of	  the	  gods	  
in	   two	   questions,	   but	   there	   is	   one	   case	  where	   information	   from	   a	   third	   question	   is	  
necessary.	   Our	   final	   step	   is	   to	   show	   that	   there	   is	   always	   at	   least	   one	   stray	   case	   to	  
scupper	  any	  two-­‐question	  solution	  strategy.	  
We	   begin	   by	   observing	   that	   there	   are	   6	   state	   descriptions	   that	   correspond	   to	   the	  
possible	  identities	  of	  the	  three	  gods.	  	  
	  
(P1) A-­‐True	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐Random	  
(P2) A-­‐True	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐False	  
(P3) A-­‐False	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐Random	  
(P4) A-­‐False	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐True	  
(P5) A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6) A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  
	  
The	  puzzle	   is	   solved	  when	  one	  possibility	   remains,	   revealing	   the	   true	   identities	  of	  all	  
three	  gods.	  	  Here	  is	  the	  first	  of	  our	  three	  questions.	  	  
	  
(Q1)	  Directed	  to	  god	  A:	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
If	  B	  is	  Random,	  then	  god	  A	  must	  be	  either	  True	  or	  False,	  in	  which	  case	  A	  cannot	  answer	  
and	  will	  remain	  silent.	  If	  A	  is	  Random,	  he	  can	  either	  answer	  or	  remain	  silent.	  If	  A	  is	  True	  
and	  B	   is	  False,	   then	  A	  will	  answer	   ‘no’.	  Finally,	   if	  A	   is	  False	  and	  B	   is	  True,	   then	  A	  will	  
answer	  ‘yes’.	  In	  more	  detail,	  we	  have	  the	  following	  possibilities.	  
	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘yes’	  to	  Q1,	  then	  three	  possibilities	  remain:	  	  Either	  A	  is	  False,	  B	  is	  True,	  
and	  C	  is	  Random,	  or	  A	  is	  Random.	   	   	   	   	   	  
(P3)	   A-­‐False	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐Random	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  
	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘no’	  to	  Q1,	  then	  three	  possibilities	  remain:	  	  Either	  A	  is	  True,	  B	  is	  False,	  and	  
C	  is	  Random,	  or	  A	  is	  Random.	  
(P1)	   A-­‐True	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐Random	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  	  	  
	  
If	  A	  gives	  no	  answer	  to	  Q1,	  then	  four	  possibilities	  remain:	  	  Either	  A	  is	  Random	  or	  B	  is	  
Random.	  
(P2)	   A-­‐True	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐False	  
(P4)	   A-­‐False	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐True	  	  	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  	  
	  
So,	   whatever	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   first	   question,	   we	  may	   identify	   a	   god	   who	   is	   not	  
Random.	   	   If	   A	   answers	   either	   ‘yes’	   or	   ‘no’,	   then	   B	   is	   not	   Random,	   and	   if	   A	   remains	  
silent,	  then	  C	  is	  not	  Random.	  Now,	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  question.	  
	  
(Q2)	  Put	   to	  B	  or	  C	  we	  now	  know	  not	   to	  be	  Random:	  Would	  you	  and	  the	  god	  not	  
questioned	  thus	  far	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  
south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
The	  possible	  answers	  to	  Q2	  depend	  on	  how	  A	  answers	  Q1.	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘yes’	  to	  Q1,	  then,	  given	  the	  open	  possibilities	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  know	  that	  B	  
is	   not	  Random.	   	   So,	   the	   second	  question	  put	   to	  B	   is	   this:	  Would	   you	  and	  C	   give	   the	  
same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Lisbon	   is	   south	   of	   Oxford?	   	   However	   B	  
responds,	  we	  may	  determine	  the	  identify	  of	  each	  god	  since	  B	  answers	  ‘yes’	  if	  and	  only	  
if	  (P6)	  is	  actual,	  B	  answers	  ‘no’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (P5)	  is	  actual,	  and	  B	  is	  silent	  if	  and	  only	  if	  
(P3)	  is	  actual.	  	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘no’	  to	  Q1,	  then,	  given	  the	  open	  possibilities	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  know	  that	  B	  
is	  not	  Random.	  So,	  the	  same	  question	   is	  put	  to	  B,	  namely,	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  
same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Lisbon	   is	   south	   of	   Oxford?	   	   Here	   again	   B	  
answers	  ‘yes’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (P6)	  is	  actual,	  B	  answers	  ‘no’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  	  (P5)	  is	  actual,	  and	  
B	  is	  silent	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (P1)	  is	  actual.	  	  
If	  A	  gives	  no	  answer	  to	  Q1,	  then,	  given	  the	  open	  possibilities	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  know	  that	  
C	  is	  not	  random.	  So,	  the	  second	  question	  is	  directed	  to	  C:	   	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  
same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   Lisbon	   is	   south	   of	  Oxford?	   Here	   C	   answers	  
‘yes’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (P5)	  is	  actual	  and	  C	  answers	  ‘no’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (P6)	  is	  actual,	  but	  if	  C	  is	  
silent	  then	  either	  (P2)	  is	  actual	  or	  (P4)	  is	  actual.	  
	  
So,	  two	  questions	  suffice	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzle	  unless	  one	  fails	  to	  elicit	  an	  answer	  to	  both	  
Q1	   and	   Q2.	   To	   resolve	   the	   uncertainty	   between	   (P2)	   and	   (P4)	   in	   this	   case,	   a	   third	  
question	  is	  required.	  	  
	  
(Q3)	  Put	  to	  A:	  	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
Since	  we	  know	  that	  B	  is	  Random,	  A	  answers	  ‘yes’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  state	  (P4)	  is	  actual	  and	  A	  
answers	  ‘no’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  state	  (P2)	  is	  actual.	  	  
	  
To	  turn	  this	  argument	  into	  a	  solution	  to	  Uzquiano’s	  puzzle,	  where	  A,	  B,	  and	  C	  will	  only	  
answer	   ‘da’	   or	   ‘ja’	   to	   our	   questions,	   if	   they	   answer	   at	   all,	   we	  will	  make	   use	   of	   two	  
lemmas.	   	   First,	   let	   Q	   be	   some	   yes-­‐no	   question	   and,	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   Roberts	   (2001),	  
suppose	  that	  Q+	  is	  a	  question	  template	  of	  the	  following	  form,	  
	  
Q+:	   Would	  you	  answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q?	  
	  
If	  the	  response	  ‘ja’	  indicates	  affirmation	  in	  the	  gods’	  language,	  and	  the	  correct	  answer	  
to	  Q	   is	   ‘yes’,	   then	   True	  will	   answer	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q	   and	   thus	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q+,	  whereas	   False	  will	  
answer	   ‘da’	   to	  Q	  and	   thus	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q+.	   	   If	   instead	   the	   response	   ‘ja’	   indicates	  denial	   in	  
their	   language,	   then	  True	  will	  answer	   ‘da‘	   to	  Q	  and	  subsequently	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q+,	  whereas	  
False	  will	   answer	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q	  and	   then	   ‘ja’	   to	  Q+.	  Hence,	  both	  gods	  True	  and	  False	  will	  
answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q+,	  for	  a	  yes-­‐question	  Q,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  ‘ja’	  means	  ‘yes’	  or	  ‘no’.	  
Adapting	   this	   reasoning	   for	   a	   no-­‐question,	   and	   putting	   these	   observations	   together	  
yields	  the	  embedded	  question	  lemma	  in	  Rabern	  and	  Rabern	  (2008:	  108),	  	  	  
	  
(EQL)	  When	  Q+	  is	  posed	  to	  either	  True	  or	  False,	  each	  replies	  ‘ja’	   if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  
correct	  answer	  to	  Q	  is	  ‘yes’.	  
	  
This	  lemma	  is	  insufficient	  to	  discriminate	  True	  from	  False,	  however.	  For	  this,	  consider	  
two	  new	  question	  templates,	  Q’	  and	  Q*.	  
	  
Q’:	   	  Would	  you	  answer	  a	  word	  meaning	  ‘yes’	  in	  your	  language	  to	  whether	  Q?	  
Q*:	  	  Would	  you	  answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q’?	  
	  
If	   the	  response	   ‘ja’	   indicates	  affirmation	  and	  the	  correct	  answer	  to	  Q	   is	   ‘yes’,	   then	   in	  
reply	  to	  Q,	  Q’	  and	  Q*,	  True	  will	  always	  answer	  ‘ja’	  whereas	  False	  will	  answer	  ‘da’	  to	  Q,	  	  
‘ja’	   to	  Q’	   but	   ‘da’	   to	  Q*.	   	   Similarly,	   if	   the	   response	   ‘ja’	   indicates	   affirmation	   and	   the	  
correct	  answer	  to	  Q	  is	  ‘no’,	  then	  in	  reply	  to	  Q*,	  True	  will	  always	  answer	  ‘da’	  to	  Q,	  Q’	  
and	  Q*	  and	  False	  will	  answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q,	  ‘da’	  to	  Q’	  and	  again	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q*.	  By	  an	  analogous	  
line	  of	  reasoning,	  if	  instead	  the	  response	  ‘ja’	  indicates	  denial	  and	  the	  correct	  answer	  to	  
Q	  is	  ‘no’	  (‘yes’),	  then	  in	  reply	  to	  Q*	  True	  will	  answer	  ‘ja’	  (‘da’)	  and	  False	  will	  answer	  ‘da’	  
(‘ja’),	  respectively.	  	  	  
	  
Putting	  these	  observations	  together	  yields	  a	  decoder	  lemma,	  	  
	  
(DL)	  	   True	  and	  False	  use	  the	  responses	  ‘ja’	  and	  ‘da’	  to	  reply	  to	  Q*	  precisely	  as	  they	  
each,	   according	   to	   their	   natures,	   would	   use	   ‘yes’	   and	   ‘no’	   to	   reply	   to	   Q,	  
respectively.	  	  
	  
To	  solve	  Uzquiano’s	  puzzle,	  we	  replace	  Q	  in	  our	  question	  template	  Q’	  by	  Q1,	  Q2,	  and	  
Q3,	  yielding	  the	  following	  three	  questions:	  
	  
(Q1*)	  Directed	   to	   god	   A:	  Would	   you	   answer	   ‘ja’	   to	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   you	  
would	  answer	  with	  a	  word	  that	  means	  ‘yes’	  in	  your	  language	  to	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  you	  and	  B	  would	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  
	  
(Q2*)	  Put	  to	  one	  of	  B	  or	  C	  we	  now	  know	  not	  to	  be	  Random:	  Would	  you	  answer	  ‘ja’	  
to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  you	  would	  answer	  with	  a	  word	  that	  means	  ‘yes’	  in	  
your	  language	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  you	  and	  the	  god	  not	  addressed	  by	  
(Q1)	   give	   the	   same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Lisbon	   is	   south	   of	  
Oxford?	  	  
	  
(Q3*)	   Put	   to	   A:	   	  Would	   you	   answer	   ‘ja’	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   you	   would	  
answer	   with	   a	   word	   that	   means	   ‘yes’	   in	   your	   language	   to	   the	   question	   of	  
whether	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  
south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
Finally,	   in	  discussing	  his	  puzzle,	  Uzquiano	  considers	  what	  would	  happen	   if	  both	  True	  
and	  False	  have	  the	  oracular	  ability	  to	  predict	  Random’s	  answers	  even	  before	  the	  coin	  
lands	  in	  Random’s	  brain.	  The	  wrinkle	  introduced	  by	  this	  possibility	  is	  that,	  even	  though	  
Random	   remains	   random	   to	   our	   eyes,	   he	   is	   entirely	   predictable	   to	   his	   peers.	  	  
Fortunately,	  Uzquiano’s	  construction	  for	  this	  scenario	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  our	  solution,	  
too.	  	  Following	  Uzquiano	  (2010),	  we	  make	  use	  of	  the	  following	  observation:	  	  
	  
(L):	   Would	  you	  answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  you	  would	  answer	  ‘da’	  to	  L?	  
	  
Neither	  True	  nor	  False	  will	  answer	  L,	  since	  each	  is	  required	  to	  answer	  ‘ja’	  if	  and	  only	  if	  
his	   answer	   is	   ‘da’,	   and	   it	   is	   prohibited	   by	   their	   natures	   to	   answer	   undecidable	  
questions.	   However,	   whether	   Random	   answers	   ‘ja’	   or	   ‘da’,	   or	   whether	   Random	  
answers	  at	  all,	  is	  entirely	  a	  random	  matter.	  	  	  
	  
We	   can	   now	   ask	   a	   question	   that	   separates	   the	   states	   into	   the	   same	   clusters	   of	   our	  
previous	  solution.	  	  
	  
(Q1**)	  	   Put	  to	  A:	  Would	  you	  answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  B	  is	  Random	  and	  
you	  would	  answer	  ‘da’	  to	  Q1**?	  
	  
If	   B	   is	   not	   Random	   the	   first	   conjunct	   is	   false,	   which	   suffices	   to	   render	   Q1**	   false.	  
Therefore,	  if	  the	  answer	  is	  ’ja’	  then	  A	  must	  be	  either	  False	  or	  Random;	  if	  the	  answer	  is	  
‘da’	  then	  A	  is	  either	  True	  or	  Random;	  if	  the	  answer	  is	  silence,	  then	  A	  is	  Random.	  If	  B	  is	  
Random,	  then	  A	  is	  either	  True	  or	  False	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  he	  will	  remain	  silent.	  
	  
So	  when	  A	  is	  silent,	  then	  either	  A	  is	  Random	  or	  B	  is	  Random.	  But	  this	  yields	  exactly	  the	  
3	  clusters	  we	  observed	  after	  question	  Q1,	  so	  a	  similar	  three-­‐question	  strategy	  can	  be	  
pursued.	  
	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘ja’	  to	  Q1**,	  then	  three	  possibilities	  remain.	  	  Either	  A	  is	  False,	  B	  is	  True,	  
and	  C	  is	  Random,	  or	  A	  is	  Random.	   	   	   	   	   	  
(P3)	   A-­‐False	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐Random	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  
	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘da’	  to	  Q1**,	  then	  three	  possibilities	  remain.	  	  Either	  A	  is	  True,	  B	  is	  False,	  
and	  C	  is	  Random,	  or	  A	  is	  Random.	  
(P1)	   A-­‐True	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐Random	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  
	  
If	  A	  gives	  no	  answer	  to	  Q1**,	  then	  four	  possibilities	  remain:	  	  Either	  A	  is	  Random	  or	  B	  is	  
Random.	  
(P2)	   A-­‐True	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐False	  
(P4)	   A-­‐False	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐True	  
(P5)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐False	  
(P6)	   A-­‐Random	   B-­‐False	   C-­‐True	  
	  
As	  before,	  whatever	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  question,	  we	  may	  identify	  a	  god	  who	  is	  
not	  Random.	   If	  A	  answers	  either	   ‘ja’	  or	   ‘da’,	   then	  B	   is	  not	  Random,	  and	   if	  A	   remains	  
silent,	  then	  C	  is	  not	  Random.	  Now,	  the	  second	  question:	  	  
	  
Q2**	   Put	   either	   to	   B	   or	   C	  whom	  we	   now	   know	   not	   to	   be	   Random:	   	  Would	   you	  
answer	  ‘ja’	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  A	  is	  not	  Random	  and	  you	  would	  answer	  
‘da’	  to	  Q2**?	  
	  
Finally,	  a	  third	  question	  is	  required	  only	  if	  we	  know	  that	  B	  is	  Random.	  	  
	  
Q3**	  Put	  to	  A:	  	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  hardest	  logic	  puzzle	  ever	  can	  be	  solved	  in	  three	  questions.	  But,	  even	  though	  
our	  solution	  requires	  three	  questions,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  that	  there	  isn’t	  a	  clever	  two-­‐
question	  solution	  waiting	   in	  the	  wings?	  To	  resolve	  this	  worry,	  we	  appeal	   to	  a	   lemma	  
from	  Information	  Theory:	  
	  
(QL)	  If	  a	  question	  has	  N	  possible	  answers,	  these	  N	  answers	  cannot	  distinguish	  
M	  >	  N	  different	  possibilities.	  
	  
Initially,	   any	   question	   put	   to	   any	   god	   has	   three	   possible	   answers,	   ‘ja’,	   ‘da’,	   and	   no	  
response,	  and	  there	  are	  six	  different	  possibilities	  to	  distinguish,	  (P1)	  through	  (P6).	  	  So,	  
by	  (QL),	  it	  follows	  trivially	  that	  the	  puzzle	  cannot	  be	  solved	  in	  one	  question.	  To	  have	  a	  
shot	   at	   solving	   the	   puzzle	   in	   two	   questions,	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	   there	   to	   be	   a	   first	  
question	   that	   reduces	   the	   number	   of	   possibilities	   to	   no	   more	   than	   three.	   Our	   first	  
question	  fails	  this	  condition	  precisely	  when	  there	  is	  no	  response,	  since	  this	  leaves	  four	  
possibilities	  to	  consider.	  	  To	  see	  that	  this	  limitation	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  any	  solution	  and	  not	  
merely	  our	  own,	  observe	  that	  whatever	  first	  question	  is	  posed	  to	  whichever	  god,	  say	  
to	  A,	  we	  cannot	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  A	   is	  Random,	  since	  Random	  may	  answer	  
‘ja’,	  ‘da’,	  or	  remain	  silent.	  But,	  if	  A	  were	  Random,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  information	  in	  his	  
response	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  distinguish	  between	  states	  (P5)	  and	  (P6).	  So,	  for	  each	  
of	   the	   three	   possible	   answers	   to	   the	   first	   question,	   states	   (P5)	   and	   (P6)	   will	   not	   be	  
eliminated.	   	  So,	   the	  best	  we	  can	  do	   is	   to	  split	   the	  four	  remaining	  states	  by	  the	  three	  
possible	   replies.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   always	   a	   scenario	   in	   which	   at	   least	   four	   possibilities	  
remain	  after	  the	  first	  question.	  Because	  any	  question	  has	  three	  distinct	  answers,	   ‘ja’,	  
‘da’,	   and	   no	   answer,	   the	   scenario	   in	   which	   there	   are	   four	   possibilities	   cannot	   be	  
distinguished	  by	  a	  single	  question.	  For	  this	  case	  a	  third	  question	  is	  necessary.2	  3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  More	  formally,	  (QL)	  says	  that	  an	  answer	  can	  decrease	  the	  initial	  entropy	  of	  an	  agent’s	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  gods	  by	  the	  maximum	  quantity	  of	  information	  an	  answer	  
	  
Finally,	   there	   is	  one	   loose	  thread	  to	   tie	  up.	  Our	  general	  strategy	  avoids	  posing	  direct	  
questions	   about	   the	   identities	   of	   the	   gods,	   which	   we	   regard	   as	   a	   virtue,	   but	   our	  
strategy	  for	  handling	  Uzquiano’s	  oracular	  gods	  does	  not	  meet	  this	  standard:	  	   in	  Q1**	  
and	  Q2**	  we	  ask	  whether	  some	  god	  or	  another	  is	  Random.	  	  To	  force	  this	  option	  off	  the	  
table,	  suppose	  the	  gods	  all	  refuse	  to	  snitch	  on	  one	  another.	  	  According	  to	  their	  code	  of	  
omertà,	  if	  a	  god	  is	  asked	  a	  direct	  question	  about	  his	  identity	  or	  the	  identity	  of	  another	  
god,	   he	   remains	   silent	   rather	   than	   answer	   according	   to	   his	   nature.	   	   To	   make	   our	  
general	   strategy	   truly	   general,	   we	   may	   jettison	   self-­‐referential	   questions	   altogether	  
and	  instead	  pose	  questions	  that	  exploit	  differences	  in	  each	  god’s	  behavior	  over	  time.	  
	  
(∀Q1**)	   Put	   to	   A:	  Will	   B	   always	   answer	   differently	   from	   you	   to	   the	   question	   of	  
whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  
	  
(∀Q2**)	  	  Put	  either	  to	  B	  or	  C,	  we	  now	  know	  not	  to	  be	  Random:	  Would	  you	  and	  the	  
god	   not	   asked	   so	   far	   always	   answer	   differently	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	  
Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  
	  
Then,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  we	  may	  simply	  recycle	  Q3**:	  	  
	  
(∀Q3**)	   Put	   to	   A:	   	  Would	   you	   and	   C	   give	   the	   same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	  




Our	   solution	   to	   the	   hardest	   logic	   puzzle	   ever	   trades	   on	   identifying	   the	   pair	   of	   non-­‐
Random	   gods	   and	   exploiting	   their	   symmetric	   behavior	   in	   answering	   only	   decidable	  
questions,	   regardless	   of	   their	   scruples	   about	   naming	   names.	   	   Alas,	   this	   suggests	   an	  
even	  harder	  variation	  on	  the	  puzzle	   if	  we	  replace	   the	  god	  False	  with	  another	  named	  
Devious:	  
	  
Three	   gods,	   A,	   B,	   and	   C	   are	   called	   in	   some	   order,	   True,	   Random,	   and	  
Devious.	  True	  always	  speaks	  truly,	  and	  whether	  Random	  speaks	  truly	  or	  
falsely	  or	  whether	  Random	  speaks	  at	  all	  is	  a	  completely	  random	  manner.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
may	  convey.	  When	  there	  are	  four	  equally	  probable	  states,	  the	  entropy	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  H	  =	  -­‐
4(1/4)	  ×	  log2(1/4)	  =	  2	  bits.	  The	  maximum	  information	  contained	  in	  a	  3-­‐valued	  answer	  is	  I	  =	  -­‐
3(1/3)	  ×	  log2(1/3)	  =	  1.585	  bits,	  so	  the	  entropy	  can	  only	  decrease	  to	  2-­‐1.585	  =	  0.415	  bits.	  Thus,	  
our	  agent	  is	  not	  guaranteed	  certain	  knowledge	  after	  two	  questions,	  because	  that	  result	  
requires	  probability	  1	  or	  0	  to	  every	  state	  j,	  such	  that	  j’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  whole	  entropy	  is	  Hj	  
=	  pj	  ×	  log2(pj)	  is	  0.	  
3	  Unbeknown	  to	  us,	  Landon	  Rabern	  also	  has	  given	  an	  impossibility	  argument	  at	  http://landon-­‐-­‐
rabern.blogspot.com/.	  	  
Devious	  always	  speaks	  falsely,	  if	  he	  is	  certain	  he	  can;	  	  but	  if	  he	  is	  unable	  
to	  lie	  with	  certainty,	  he	  responds	  like	  Random.	  	  Your	  task	  is	  to	  determine	  
the	   identities	   of	   A,	   B,	   and	   C	   by	   asking	   three	   yes-­‐no	   questions;	   each	  
question	  must	  be	  put	   to	  exactly	  one	  god.	  The	  gods	  understand	  English,	  
but	  will	  answer	   in	   their	  own	   language,	   in	  which	   the	  words	   for	   ‘yes’	  and	  
‘no’	  are	  ‘da’	  and	  ‘ja’,	   in	  some	  order.	  You	  don’t	  know	  which	  word	  means	  
which.	  	  
And	  here	  are	  our	  guidelines:	  
1. It	  could	  be	  that	  some	  god	  gets	  asked	  more	  than	  one	  question.	  
2. What	   the	   second	  question	   is,	   and	   to	  which	  god	   it	   is	  put,	  may	  depend	  on	   the	  
answer	  to	  the	  first	  question.	  
3. Whether	  Random	  answers	  ‘da’	  or	  ‘ja’	  or	  whether	  Random	  answers	  at	  all	  should	  
be	  thought	  of	  as	  depending	  on	  the	  toss	  of	  a	  fair	  three-­‐sided	  dice	  hidden	  in	  his	  
brain:	   if	   the	   dice	   comes	   down	   1,	   he	   doesn’t	   answer	   at	   all;	   if	   the	   dice	   comes	  
down	  2,	  he	  answers	  ‘da’;	  if	  3,	  ‘ja’.	  
4. When	  Devious	  is	  able	  to	  lie	  he	  does	  so;	  but	  if	  Devious	  cannot	  be	  sure	  of	  telling	  a	  
lie,	   then	   rather	   than	   remain	   silent,	   he	   responds	   randomly	   like	   Random,	   i.e.,	  
there	   is	  a	   fair	   three-­‐sided	  dice	   in	  Devious’	  brain	  that	   is	   tossed	  when	  he	   is	  not	  
certain	   to	   lie.	   If	   the	  dice	   comes	  down	  1,	   he	  doesn’t	   answer	   at	   all;	   if	   the	  dice	  
comes	  down	  2,	  he	  answers	  ‘da’;	  if	  3,	  ‘ja’.	  
	  
Here	  is	  one	  possible	  solution.	  Initially,	  there	  are	  6	  possible	  scenarios,	  corresponding	  to	  
the	  permutations	  of	  the	  three	  gods.	  
(S1) A-­‐True	   B-­‐Devious	   C-­‐Random	  	  	  
(S2) A-­‐True	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐Devious	  	  	  	  
(S3) A-­‐Devious	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐Random	  	  	  
(S4) A-­‐Devious	   B-­‐Random	   C-­‐True	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(S5) A-­‐Random	   B-­‐True	   C-­‐Devious	  	  	  	  
(S6) A-­‐Random	   B-­‐Devious	   C-­‐True	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Our	  first	  question:	  
(QQ1)	  	  Directed	  to	  god	  A:	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
Here	  are	  the	  possible	  answers	  A	  gives	  to	  QQ1	  under	  each	  scenario:	  
(S1) ‘no’	  	  
(S2) silence	  
(S3) 	  ‘yes’	  
(S4) ‘yes’/‘no’/silence	  	  
(S5) ‘yes’/‘no’/silence	  	  
(S6) 	  ‘yes’/‘no’/silence	  	  
	  
We	  may	   rearrange	   this	   information	   into	   three	  columns,	  one	   for	  each	  of	   the	  possible	  
responses,	  and	  list	  the	  set	  of	  states	  belonging	  to	  each	  group:	  	  
Answer:	  ‘yes’	   Answer:	  ‘no’	   Answer:	  silence	  
(S3)	  D	  T	  R	   (S1)	  T	  D	  R	   (S2)	  T	  R	  D	  
(S4)	  D	  R	  T	   (S4)	  D	  R	  T	   (S4)	  D	  R	  T	  
(S5)	  R	  T	  D	   (S5)	  R	  T	  D	   (S5)	  R	  T	  D	  
(S6)	  R	  D	  T	   (S6)	  R	  D	  T	   (S6)	  R	  D	  T	  
	  
Now	   we	   show	   that	   the	   identities	   of	   the	   gods	   can	   always	   be	   determined	   in	   three	  
questions	  by	  working	  through	  each	  column.	  
Case	  1:	  ‘yes’.	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘yes’	  to	  QQ1,	  then	  the	  second	  question	  is:	  
(QQ2-­‐y)	  Directed	  to	  god	  C:	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
Then	  the	  outcomes	  for	  each	  answer	  to	  QQ2-­‐y	  are	  the	  following	  sets	  of	  possible	  states:	  
Answer:	  ‘yes’	   Answer:	  ‘no’	   Answer:	  silence	  
(S3)	  D	  T	  R	   (S3)	  D	  T	  R	   (S3)	  D	  T	  R	  
(S5)	  R	  T	  D	   (S6)	  R	  D	  T	   (S4)	  D	  R	  T	  
	   	   	  
For	  each	  column,	  a	  third	  question	  is	  posed	  to	  separate	  the	  states:	  
	  
(QQ3-­‐yy)	  	   Column	  1,	  Directed	  to	  god	  B:	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  B	  is	  True,	  there	  
are	  only	  two	  possible	  responses	  he	  can	  give:	  ‘no’,	  in	  which	  case	  state	  
(S5)	  holds;	  silence,	  in	  which	  case	  (S3)	  holds.	  
(QQ3-­‐yn)	  	   Column	  2,	  Directed	  to	  god	  B:	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  Devious	  must	  
answer	  but	  True	  must	  remain	  silent,	  again	  there	  are	  only	  two	  possible	  
responses	  B	  can	  give:	  ‘no’,	  in	  which	  case	  (S6)	  holds;	  silence,	  in	  which	  
case	  (S3)	  holds.	  
(QQ3-­‐ys)	   Column	  3,	  Directed	  to	  god	  A:	  Are	  you	  certain	  that	  you	  and	  B	  answer	  
differently	  as	  to	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  A	  is	  Devious	  
and	  he	  must	  lie	  if	  he	  is	  able,	  he	  will	  provide	  a	  non-­‐random	  answer:	  ‘no’,	  
when	  (S3)	  holds;	  ‘yes’	  when	  (S4)	  holds.	  
	  
Case	  2:	  ‘no’.	  
If	  A	  answers	  ‘no’	  to	  QQ1,	  then	  	  
(QQ2-­‐n)	  Directed	  to	  god	  C:	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  
of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  
	  
The	  outcomes	  for	  each	  answer	  to	  QQ2-­‐n	  are	  separated	  by	  a	  similar	  procedure:	  
Answer:	  ‘yes’	   Answer:	  ‘no’	   Answer:	  silence	  
(S1)	  T	  D	  R	   (S1)	  T	  D	  R	   (S1)	  T	  D	  R	  
(S5)	  R	  T	  D	   (S6)	  R	  D	  T	   (S4)	  D	  R	  T	  
	   	   	  
Then,	  just	  as	  before,	  for	  each	  column	  a	  third	  question	  is	  posed	  to	  resolve	  the	  identities	  
of	  the	  gods.	  
	  
(QQ3-­‐ny)	  Column	  1,	  Directed	  to	  god	  B:	  Would	  you	  and	  A	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  Devious	  must	  
answer	  but	  True	  must	  remain	  silent,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  possible	  responses	  
B	  can	  give:	  ‘yes’,	  in	  which	  case	  (S1)	  holds;	  silence,	  in	  which	  case	  (S5)	  holds.	  
(QQ3-­‐nn)	  Column	  2,	  Directed	  to	  god	  B:	  Are	  you	  certain	  that	  you	  and	  C	  answer	  
differently	  as	  to	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  B	  is	  Devious	  and	  
he	  must	  lie	  if	  he	  is	  able,	  he	  will	  provide	  a	  non-­‐random	  answer:	  ‘no’,	  when	  
(S6)	  holds;	  ‘yes’	  when	  (S1)	  holds.	  
(QQ3-­‐ns)	  Column	  3,	  Directed	  to	  god	  A:	  Would	  you	  and	  C	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  Since	  Devious	  must	  
answer	  but	  True	  must	  remain	  silent,	  again	  there	  are	  only	  two	  possible	  
responses	  A	  can	  give:	  ‘yes’,	  in	  which	  case	  (S4)	  holds;	  silence,	  in	  which	  case	  
(S1)	  holds.	  
	  
Case	  3:	  silence.	  
If	  A	  is	  silent	  to	  QQ1,	  then	  	  
(QQ2-­‐s)	  Directed	  to	  god	  C:	  Is	  Oxford	  south	  of	  Lisbon?	  	  
	  
	  Here	  we	  have	  less	  information	  to	  sort	  through.	  
Answer:	  ‘yes’	   Answer:	  ‘no’	   Answer:	  silence	  
(S2)	  T	  R	  D	   (S4)	  D	  R	  T	   -­‐	  
(S5)	  R	  T	  D	   (S6)	  R	  D	  T	   -­‐	  
	   	   	  
For	  each	  column	  a	  third	  question	  is	  posed	  to	  separate	  the	  states,	  
	  
(QQ3-­‐sy)	  Column	  1,	  Directed	  to	  god	  C:	  	  Are	  you	  certain	  that	  you	  and	  B	  answer	  
differently	  as	  to	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  If	  C	  replies	  ‘yes’,	  then	  
(S2)	  holds.	  If	  C	  replies	  ‘no’,	  (S5)	  holds.	  
(QQ3-­‐sn)	  Column	  2,	  Directed	  to	  god	  C:	  	  Would	  you	  and	  B	  give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  
the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?	  	  If	  C	  replies	  ‘no’,	  then	  
(S6)	  holds.	  If	  C	  is	  silent,	  (S4)	  holds.	  
	  
Since	   three	   questions	   suffice	   to	   identify	   the	   gods	   in	   all	   possible	   cases,	   therefore	  we	  
have	  a	  3-­‐question	   solution	   for	   the	  Devious	  puzzle.	  Moreover,	   the	   lemma	   (DL),	  when	  
restricted	   to	  decidable	  questions,	   can	  be	  used	   to	  adapt	  our	   solution	   to	   the	   situation	  
where	  the	  gods	  only	  speak	  in	  their	  mother	  tongue.	  
However,	  there	  is	  a	  catch.	  Our	  solution	  hinges	  on	  the	  gods,	  unlike	  us,	  being	  aware	  of	  
who	  their	  neighbors	  are,	  but	   like	  us	   in	  not	  having	  the	  oracular	  ability	   to	  predict	  with	  
certainty	  what	  Random	  or	  Devious	  will	  say	  beforehand	  whenever	  the	  chance	  device	  in	  
each	   god’s	   brain	   is	   set	   off.	   In	   other	  words,	   although	  our	   solution	   respects	   the	   gods’	  
code	   of	   omertà,	   it	   nevertheless	   depends	   on	   the	   gods	   being	   like	   us	   in	   viewing	   the	  
outcome	  of	  a	  3-­‐sided	  dice	  throw	  as	  a	  chance	  event.	  But	  if	  instead	  we	  assume	  that	  True	  
and	  Devious	  can	  predict	  with	  certainty	  the	  outcome	  of	  any	  particular	  dice	  throw	  set	  off	  
in	  some	  other	  god’s	  head,	  then	  the	  question	  template4	  	  
(Q)	  Are	  you	  certain	  that	  Q?	  
will	  fail	  to	  exploit	  a	  god’s	  knowledge	  about	  which	  of	  his	  peers	  are	  disposed	  to	  answer	  
some	  question	  stochastically	  or	  not,	  as	  our	  solution	  demands,	  but	   instead	  will	  simply	  
track	  the	  god’s	  confidence	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  predict	  his	  peer’s	  answer	  to	  Q.	  To	  flatten	  this	  
wrinkle,	  we	  may	  exploit	  a	   limitation	  to	  the	  gods’	  predictive	  powers.	   In	  place	  of	  QQ1,	  
ask:	  	  	  
(QQ1t)	  Directed	  to	  god	  A:	  	  for	  some	  future	  time	  t	  of	  my	  choosing,	  would	  you	  and	  B	  
give	  the	  same	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford	  if	  
you	  were	  asked	  at	  t?	  	  
Even	  though	  each	  god	  may	  predict	  with	  certainty	  the	  sequence	  of	  answers	  any	  of	  their	  
peers	  would	  give	  to	  repeated	  queries	  of	  some	  yes-­‐no	  question,	  QQ1t	  effectively	  blinds	  
the	  gods	  by	  randomizing	  which	  point	   in	  the	  sequence	  of	  queries	  we	  will	  ask	  whether	  
he	   and	   one	   of	   his	   neighbors	   would	   agree	   to	   our	   yes-­‐no	   question.	   	   Since	   the	   gods	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Compare	  questions	  QQ3-­‐ys,	  QQ3-­‐nn	  and	  QQ3-­‐sy.	  
cannot	  predict	  which	  point	   in	  time	  we	  will	  choose,	  QQ1t	  suffices	   (in	  the	   long	  run)	  to	  
restore	  to	  Devious	  and	  Random	  their	  stochastic	  temperaments.	  	  
Next,	  replace	  (Q)	  by	  the	  question	  template	  
(∀Q)	  Is	  it	  always	  the	  case	  that	  Q?	  
Then,	   regardless	  of	  whether	  Devious	  views	  Random	  as	  stochastic	  or	  not,	   rather	   than	  
ask	   ‘Are	   you	   certain	   that	   you	   and	   god	   X	   answer	   differently	   as	   to	  whether	   Lisbon	   is	  
south	  of	  Oxford?’,	  ask	  ‘Is	  it	  always	  the	  case	  that	  you	  and	  god	  X	  answer	  differently	  as	  to	  
whether	  Lisbon	  is	  south	  of	  Oxford?‘	  	  
Finally,	  flatly	  asking	  True	  whether	  he	  would	  answer	  the	  same	  as	  some	  other	  god	  to	  a	  
yes-­‐no	   question	   will	   fail	   to	   distinguish	   his	   addressing	   Random	   from	   his	   addressing	  
Devious.	  Question	  QQ3-­‐yy	   is	   an	  example.	  Here,	   rather	   than	  ask	  B	   ‘Would	   you	  and	  C	  
give	   the	   same	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Lisbon	   is	   south	   of	   Oxford?’	   ask	  
instead	  ‘Would	  you	  and	  C	  always	  answer	  differently	  as	  to	  whether	  Lisbon	   is	  south	  of	  
Oxford?’	   Then,	   if	   QQ3-­‐ny	   and	   QQ3sn	   are	   likewise	   changed	   to	   `always	   answer	  
differently’	   and	   QQ3-­‐ns	   changed	   to	   ‘always	   answer	   the	   same’,	   then	   the	   revised	  
question	   strategy	   yields	   a	   solution	   for	   when	   the	   gods	   have	   the	   oracular	   ability	   to	  
predict	  with	  certainty	  how	  Random	  and	  Devious	  will	  answer	  a	  question.	  
In	   summary,	   a	   solution	   strategy	   based	   on	   the	   modal	   question	   template	   (Q)	   is	  
sensitive	   to	   whether	   the	   gods	   view	   their	   peers	   as	   stochastic	   or	   not,	   whereas	   the	  
temporal	  question	   template	   (∀Q)	   is	  not	   sensitive	   to	   this	  difference	   (in	   the	   long	   run).	  	  
Both	   of	   these	   quantified	   question	   strategies	   offer	   an	   alternative	   that	   is	   at	   least	   as	  
strong	  as	  strategies	  which	  appeal	  to	  self-­‐referential	  statements.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  question	  
whether	  the	  Devious	  puzzle	  can	  be	  solved	  without	  appealing	  to	  quantified	  questions,	  
namely	  with	  only	  self-­‐referential	  questions	  like	  (L).	  	  In	  any	  case,	  we	  are	  certain	  that	  the	  
puzzle	  cannot	  be	  solved	  in	  less	  than	  three	  questions.5	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